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Motivation

1
There is a long line of empirical research highlighting a strong link between firm char-2 acteristics, corporate finance structure and monetary policy transmission. Those 3 studies show that the effectiveness of monetary policy and the asymmetric impact 4 it will have on the economy over expansions vs recessions is dependent on the type 5 of firms in the economy and their financing composition. Understanding this link 6 has become even more timely in the current context of unconventional monetary 7 policy since the interest rate is at the zero-lower bound and an enormous amount of 8 liquidity has been injected into the banking system. Yet the willigness of banks to 9 lend to firms, in particular the SMEs has been (in relative terms) very weak. This 10 is true for both the Euro Area and the UK, but to a lesser extent also for the US.
11
Therefore, the question of whether the composition of the firm sector matters for 12 the effective transmission of monetary policy has re-emerged.
13
The current paper extends this analysis by casting the model in a behavioural 14 framework. In particular, while we maintain the effects of monetary policy on exter-15 nal financing demand and bank loan supply, we believe that assuming that agents 16 understand the entire structure of the economy and model decisions using the full 17 information set is strong. We therefore relax it and assume that agents in the econ-18 omy are rational in the sense that they learn from the past and rationally optimise in 19 their own sphere, but hold incomplete information regarding the aggregate structure 20 of the economy. However, for reasons of tractability we separate the two competing 21 corporate financing regimes into two and study the monetary transmission and its 22 impact of firms in two separate models. In other words, we consider two extreme 23 cases of the corporate finance structures considered in Bolton and Freixas (2006) 24 assuming that only one dominates in each case. This is a reasonable approximation We find strong evidence that the monetary transmission channel is stronger in 30 the bank-based system. The impulse response analysis showed that the effects from 31 a monetary expansion are approximately twice that of the MBF version. Moreover, 32 the confidence intervals are much narrower in the BBF version since the estima-1 tion of coefficients is much more precise and the variation in estimates for different 2 initializations of the learning framework is much smaller. This implies a better 3 convergence in the estimation of the bank-based model version.
4
The statistical analysis shows that while market-based financial systems gener-5 ate high asymmetries over the business cycles and a high probability mass on the 6 extremes, the bank based one produces the contrary. Also the second, third and 7 fourth moments are considerably lower in that version. This results in a better 8 empirical fit of the Euro Area model to the data. Lastly, we (discriminately) evaluate the relative effectiveness of monetary policy 10 in counteracting busts and find mixed evidence. In terms of generating higher 11 and more sustained booms, a monetary easing in the market-based system is more 12 effective. However, if we evaluate the effectiveness in terms of avoiding severe and 13 costly busts, a monetary easing in a bank-based financing system is more successful. 14 To conclude, the business cycles in the US are heavily driven by the swings in 15 (imperfect beliefs) and market sentiment. As a result, the distribution of model 16 variables become asymmetric and a lot of the probability mass is to the right of the 17 mean. In the bank-based system, on the other hand, the cycles are (proportionatly) 18 more driven by fundamentals and the probability of heavy boom and busts are 19 negligable. This results in symmetric distribution of the model variables, and a 20 smoother business cycle. 21 
Literature Review
22
The current bulk of literature can be summarized into three strands. The first strand 23 examines the mutual links between firm characteristics and monetary transmission 24 via the loan supply channel. As an example of this, Bougheas, Mizen and Yalein 25 (2006) show that small, young and risky firms are affected more by tight monetary 26 conditions than large, old and secure ones. Kashyap and Stein (2000) go a level 27 deeper and argue that when a central bank tightens policy, aggregate bank lending 28 falls and a substitution towards non-bank financing, such as commercial paper takes 29 place. As a result, aggregate investment falls by more than would be predicted 30 simply by a rise in bank interest rates. This is because small firms that do not have 31 significant buffer cash holdings are forced to reduce investment around periods of 32 tight credit. Similarly, small banks seem more prone to reduce lending compared 33 to large ones due to a lower buffer of securities. Hoshi is accounted for so that large (small) firms increase (reduce) all types of financing 4 during a monetary tightening, there is a considerable substitution away from bank 5 loans towards commercial paper.
The second strand has largely focused on the demand (and capital) channel 7 of monetary policy. So, for instance, Ashcraft and Campello (2007) argue that 8 the monetary transmission is demand rather than supply driven as in the previous 9 studies. The mechanism works through firm balance sheet and is independent from 10 the bank lending channel. Using a unique Euro Area survey and the US counterpart, is related to the durability of the good produced in the sectors, the heterogeneity 23 in asymmetry is strongly related to differences in financial structure of firms (i.e. 24 maturity structure of debt, coverage ratio, firm size and financial leverage). Hence 25 firm financial composition matters for the asymmetric effects of monetary policy.
26
The third strand has largely focused on the incentive structure of banks in order rates prior to loan origination push banks to lend more to borrowers with a weaker 33 2 Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1995) and Ludvigson (199821) also reach the same conclusion and find a strong loan supply effect of monetary policy.
4
credit history and to grant more loans with a higher probability of default. As a 1 result, the lending portfolio of banks will be riskier during loose monetary policy 2 conditions due to banks profit seeking incentives. negative productivity shock coupled with deflation produces strong incentives for 10 corporate default, which under real costs of financial distress in turn triggers a debt-11 deflation spiral.
12
The framework closest to ours is Bolton and Freixas (2006 In the baseline US version of corporate financing structure, firms basically raise 25 funds on the (bond) market. More specifically, their access to external funds depends 26 mainly on the value of internal funds firms hold, which in turn depends on the stock 27 market value of their capital. In essence, the quantity they can borrow depends on 28 the ability they have to raise funds on the market. This is the structure described 29
in De Grauwe and Gerba (2015) or De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015).
30
3 There is a large literature incorporating the various financing regimes of firms in their general equilibrium modelings. However, models that specifically look at the various (and asymmetric) effects of monetary policy on firm financing under different regimes have been fewer.
In the second version of the model, on the other hand, the amount that firms 1 can borrow depends entirely on banks' willigness to lend. To be more specific, the 2 rate at which bank lend funds to firms depends on three factors: their market power 3 in the retail branch, the cost of managing bank capital in the wholesale branch, 4 and the adjustment costs faced in changing the lending rate by the retail branch.
5
The second component is moreover time-varying, which means that the rate will 6 fluctuate over the business cycle. This approach in modelling the financial sector In the next subsection, we will proceed by briefly outlining the corporate financ-10 ing regime used in De Grauwe and Gerba (2015). We will amend the model to fit 11 the Euro Area financing structure in the following subsection. In section 3 we will 12 discuss and compare the two transmissions, while section 4 concludes. 
17
Firms borrow money from the market paying an interest rate which normally 18 exceeds the risk-free interest rate. Hence the cost of market funds ef t t is equal to 19 the risk free rate r t plus a spread x t as:
The spread between the two rates depends on firms' equity:
Following the collateral constraint approach used in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
22
(1999), the quantity of funds that firms can access on the market depends on the The value of equity of firms is determined by stock markets. When during a 4 boom the asset prices (esentially equity) of good firms go up, the firm's collateral 5 constraint relaxes and its creditworthness improves. In contrast, during busts asset 6 prices decline and firm's collateral constraint becomes more biting. In order to have 7 asset price variability to contribute to the volatility in firms' equity, we connect 8 firms' market capitalization to the number of time-varying sharesn t multiplied by 9 the current share price S t , or:
Using the standard Gordon discounted dividend model, share prices in turn 11
depend on the discounted value of all future dividends:
where;
with E t [Λ t+1 denoting expected future dividends net of a discount rate R s t . The 14 rate consists of a risk-free component r t and a constant equity premium ξ. The 15 stable growth Gordon model assumes that dividends grow at a constant rate. The 16 forecasts made by agents about future dividends follow the logic of forecasts they 17 make for the output and inflation gaps (which will be described further below). 18 Agents assume the 1-period ahead forecast of dividends to be a fraction f of nominal 19 GDP one period ahead.
5 Since nominal GDP consists of a real and and an inflation 20 component, agents make forecasts regarding future output gap as well as inflation. 21
These forecasts are reevaluated sequentially in each period. Agents are willing to 22
4 In de Grauwe and Gerba (2015) and De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) the counterpart to firms in lending are banks. However these banks operate under zero profit and act as shadow lenders. In reality what determines whether and what quantity firms can borrow is the value of their internal funds, or equity. The price of equity is determined by the stock market. Hence, the stock market determines if and how much firms can borrow. Therefore banks balance sheet is not necessary in this lending mechanism and can be directly reduced to market-type of lending.
5 Just as in De Grauwe and Gerba (2015) dividends are supposed to be constant from t+1 onwards.
switch to another forecasting rule if this performs better than the current rule. Now that we have connected firm equity to stock markets, we can rewrite the 10 external finance spread as:
As a result, stock prices directly influence the financing spread via firms' financial 12 positions. Given this, we can write firms' leverage position as:
This leverage ratio is time-varying, and therefore endogenous to the business 14 cycle. Remember that the more a firms is leveraged, the stronger the amplification imperfect bank-driven credit production, where banks take deposits from savers, 4 bunde these up into multiple credit lines, and give out loans to firms at a cost 5 determined by the intrinsic (loan) production technology. At the same time, bank 6 manages capital in a (dynamically) rational manner in order to cushion against 7 future shocks to its balance sheet. To facilitate the exposition, we seperate the bank 8 capital management branch (wholesale sector) from the loan management (retail 9 sector) activity as in Gerali et al (2010).
10
We can think of the banks as composed of two retail branches and one wholesale 11 branch. The first retail branch is responsible for giving out differentiated loans to 12 firms and the second for raising differentiated deposits. Banks operate in a compet-13 itive environment in the wholesale sector, but behave monopolistically competitive 14 a la Dixit-Stiglitz in the retail one. Their ability to change rates in the retail sec-15 tor depends on the market power they hold in that segment (determined by the 16 
Wholesale branch
19
The balance sheet of the commercial bank can be defined as:
D t are total deposits, B t are total loans (given out to firms via the retail loan 21 branch), and π B t n B t is the real value of bank equity, where n B t is the number of stocks 22 of banks and π B t is the price. 7 The leverage is thus the ratio between its loans and 23 equity. In this respect banks are subject to an explicit capital-to-asset ratio:
Whenever the bank moves away from the targeted capital-to-asset ratio ϑ B , the 25 bank pays a quadratic cost (expressed in terms of additional capital requirement). 26
This cost is internalized by the wholesale branch and carried over to the lender, 27 7 The price of stocks is exogenously determined.
9
which allows us to describe the lending wholesale rate as:
The quadratic cost of deviating from the target has the functional form equal to 
The left-hand side represents marginal benefit from increasing lending since an 7 increase in profits is equal to the spread. Meanwhile, the right-hand side represents 8 the marginal cost from doing so in terms of the additional expenses arising for 9 deviating from the optimal capital-to-asset ratio. 
,which in absence of inertias can be reduced to:
This is the external finance premium that firms face. The premium is propor- ticity is stochastic and exogenously determined. These innovations to elasticity can 4 be seen as alterations independent from the monetary policy. Assuming symmetry 5 amongst firms, their aggregate demand for loans at bank j can be expressed as:
To interpret this expression, the loan that firm i gets depends on the overall 7 volume of loans given to all firms, and on the interest rate charged on loans by bank 8 j relative to the rate index for that kind of loans. 
Deposit retail branch
10
In an analogous way, the retail unit collect deposits from savers and passes the 11 funds funds on to the wholesale branch. They remunerate these funds at rate r t . 12 The quadratic adjustment costs for changing the deposit rate are determined by the 13 parameter determining adjustment costs in deposit rate setting, κ D , and are pro-14 portional to aggregate interest paid on deposits. Analogous to the retail borrowing 15 rate, the deposit rate can be described as:
,which in absence of inertias, is simply a markdown over the policy rate:
The demand for deposits of saver i is symmetrically obtained to the case of 18 loan rate determination in the previous subsection. Once again we assume that 19 the contracts that savers use to deposit money are a composite constant elasticity 20 of substitution basket of slightly differentiated financial products -each supplied 21
8 The loan elasticity B t is assumed to be above 1. 9 In Gerali et al (2010) this expression is derived after minimizing over all firms B t (i, j) the total repayment due to the continuum of banks j,
) is the markup that banks apply on loans. Here we just take the derived first-order-condition and aggregate amongst firms. The microfoundations are, however, straight forward.
by a branch of a bank j -and with elasticity D t . 10 The elasticity is stochastic and 1 exogenously determined. Once again, these innovations to elasticity can be seen as 2 alterations independent from the monetary policy. Assuming symmetry amongst 3 savers, their aggregate demand for deposits at bank j can by analogy to the above 4 case be expressed as:
,where d t are the aggregate deposits in the economy, r 
Each period profits are accumulated in a standard fashion, and added on to the 13 existing bank equity stock according to:
Banks' equity position has a core role in the functioning of the financial system 15 since it (simultaneously) determines the quantity and the price of loans supplied.
16
On one hand, it determines the external finance premium of firms (the cost of taking 
is the markup that banks apply on deposits. Here we just take the derived first-order-condition and aggregate amongst savers. The micro-foundations are, however, direct.
Aggregate dynamics 1
For the American MBF system, we keep the equations as in the benchmark De 2 Grauwe and Gerba (2015) model. In that framework, the aggregate demand equa-3 tion can be expressed as:
Notice that apart from the standard terms derived in De Grauwe(2011, 2012) 5
and De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), aggregate demand depends on the usable 6 capital in the production, u t k t discounted for the cost of financing (x t ).
7
The reader will also notice that aggregate demand depends on the external fi-8 nance (or risk) premium x t . This is a reduced form expression for investment, since 9 investment is governed directly by this premium, and therefore it is the dependent 10 variable (see DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) for a derivation of this term).
11
For the European BBF case, we will need to make some amendments to the 12 above expression.
13
First, we use expression 12 to redefine the external finance premium in I.1, and 14 get:
,where Following Gerali et al (2010) we add the net bank equity (net of equity depreciation 19 rate δ B ) to the above expression:
Third, we include the adjustment costs from changing the (deposit and lending) 21
rates into the term Adj t .
22
As is standard, the aggregate supply (AS) equation is obtained from the price 23 13 descrimination problem of retailers (monopolistically competitive): 
3
To complete the model, we will briefly outline the imperfect beliefs-setting and 4 learning dynamics that we make use of in this framework. Under rational expectations, the expectational term will equal its realized value 7 in the next period, i.e. E t X t+1 = X t+1 , denoting generically by X t any variable 8 in the model. However, as anticipated above, we depart from this assumption in 9 this framework by considering bounded rationality as in DeGrauwe (2011, 2012).
10
Expectations are replaced by a convex combination of heterogeneous expectation 11 operators E t y t+1 =Ẽ t y t+1 and E t π t+1 =Ẽ t π t+1 . In particular, agents forecast 12 output and inflation using two alternative forecasting rules: fundamentalist rule vs. a random walk approach. 12 We can formally express the fundamentalists in inflation
19
and output forecasting as:
and the extrapolists in both cases as:
E e t y t+1 = θy t−1 (27) 12 The latest available observation is the best forecast of the future.
14 This particular form of adaptive expectations has previously been modelled by 1 Pesaran (1987) , and Hommes (1997, 1998) , amongst others, in the liter-2 ature. Setting θ = 1 captures the "naive" agents (as they have a strong belief in 3 history dependence), while a θ < 1 or θ > 1 represents an "adaptive" or an "extrap-4
olative" agent (Brock and Hommes, 1998) . For reasons of tractability, we set θ = 1 5 in this model.
6
Note that for the sake of consistency with the DSGE model, all variables here 7
are expressed in gaps. Focusing on their cyclical component makes the model sym-8 metric with respect to the steady state (see Harvey and Jaeger, 1993) . Therefore, as 9
DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) show, it is not necessary to include a zero lower 10 bound constraint in the model since a negative interest rate should be understood 11
as a negative interest rate gap. In general terms, the equilibrium forecast/target for 12 each variable will be equal to its' setady state value. evidence of extrapolative behaviour, in particular for inflation forecasts).
26
The aggregate market forecasts of output gap and inflation is obtained as a 27
weighted average of each rule: ,where the utilities are defined as:
and w k = (ρ k (1 − ρ)) (with 0 < ρ < 1) are gemoetrically declining weights case, agents decide to be one type or the other simply by tossing a coin, implying a 13 probability of each type equalizing to 0.5. On the other hand, γ = ∞ imples a fully 14 deterministic utility, and the probability of using the fundamentalist (extrapolative) 1 rule is either 1 or 0. Another way of interpreting γ is in terms of learning from past 2 performance: γ = 0 imples zero willingness to learn, while it increases with the size 3 of the parameter, i.e. 0 < γ < ∞.
4
As mentioned above, agents will subject the performance of rules to a fit mea-5 sure and choose the one that performs best. In that sense, agents are 'boundedly' 6 rational and learn from their misstakes. More importantly, this discrete choice mech-7
anism allows to endogenize the distribution of heterogeneous agents over time with 8 the proportion of each agent using a certain rule (parameter α). The approach is Grauwe and Gerba (2015). We refer to that paper for a more detailed discussion, 18
as well as to the parameter list in the Appendix.
19
The parameters specific to the banking sector and the loan-deposit production 20
are parametrized to the values in Gerali et al (2010). This is because their model 21
attempts to replicate the banking sector frictions present in the Euro Area, which 22 is also our interest here. The parameters that are calibrated in their model have 23
the same values in our BBF version. So, for instance, banks' capital-to-asset target 24 ratio, ς is set to 0.09 in order to reflect a low-and-stable leverage in the banking 25 sector (which is optimal from the perspective of the macroprudential authority 
−1 e 2 −ψτ −1 e 2 0 0 0
In the BBF version, the system of equations for the five variables looks instead 3 like:
Using matrix notation, we can write this as:
We can solve for Z t by inverting:
and assuring A to be non-singular.
5
The only difference is that the equation for financing spread (line 3 in matrices variables, their equilibrium forecasts and current exogenous shocks.
18
Note that for the forecasts of output and inflation gap, the forward looking 14 However, external financing spread, capital, and savings do not need to be forecasted as these do not affect the dynamics of the model (i.e. there is no structure of higher order beliefs as law of iterated expectations does not hold in the behavioural model). See section 3.1 in DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli (2015) for comparison of solutions under rational expectations and bounded rationality ("heuristics").
Forcing variables 1
The shock we will examine in this paper is primarely a standard (negative) monetary 2 policy shock ( ):
,where is a white noise monetary policy shock which is calibrated to 0.5 in both 4 versions of the model. Note in matrix E that the monetary policy shock is scaled 5
by the leverage gap in the banking sector (ς − ς t ). This gap measures how much the 6 banking sector is away from its' targeted (or optimal) leverage ratio. The bigger 7 the gap, the more leveraged the banking sector, and the stronger effect a monetary 8 policy shock will have on the system. This is in order to capture the enhanced effects 9
that leveraging has on flows, in particular when a de-leveraging spiral is triggered. cessions. In particular, we wish to understand whether monetary policy is more 18 effective in reviving the economy during recessions in the US or Euro Area. As is standard, an expansionary monetary policy (0.5% fall) leads to a fall in the ex-8 ternal finance premium, which relaxes the credit that firms can access and therefore 17 Initially, output falls by 0.25% as well as inflation by 0.05%, but this is reverted after 1 period. This finding is frequent in the literature and denominated as the price puzzle.
22
(0.2%), which also permits them to rise loans by 0.75%. The resulting effect is an 1 increase in leverage by 0.1%, but also a substantial increase in bank profitability, 2 since its profits rise considerably over time (accumulating up to 400% in 10 years 3 after the shock).
4
The confidence intervals are also much narrower in this version of the model. 5
Since firm leverage plays a less central role in the intermediation mechanism of the 6 bank-based model version, the uncertainty arising from its estimated coefficients 7 is not passed-on onto the model dynamics to the same extent. As a result, the 8 variation around the median impulse response is now much smaller, and the IRF 9 distribution is more tight. The last contrast we wish to make is the level of asymmetry that we find in the 2 model. Looking at the histograms in Figures I.8 and I.9, we can say that most of 3 the variables have a more asymmetric distribution in the MBF model. For output, 4 capital, asset prices and utilization costs, there is a higher probability mass to the 5 right than to the left of the mean. For inflation, the opposite is true. This means 6 that a market-based financial system produces more sentiment-pronounced cyclical 7 dynamics where heavy optimism results in a prolonged period of boom but also in 8 a sharp subsequent bust. Those heavy sentimient swings, however, are not to the 9 same extent present in the bank-based model. Instead there is symmetry between 10 periods of boom and bust, and the dynamics in the economy is to a larger extent 11 driven by fundamentals. This is confirmed by the (almost) symmetric distributions 12 of output, capital and asset prices implying a relatively equal split between the left-13
and-right-end probability mass. What is more, there seems to be a heavier bias 14 towards negative outlook on the future or pessimism in the BBF version. bringing the key inflation rate close to its 2% target level has been the key concern 20 of the ECB for the past five years. The relative success of it, however, is still very 21 unclear.
22
In the current paper we look at one aspect of this problematic. In particular, 23 we study the relative effectiveness of monetary policy in a bank-based and in a 24 market-based (corporate) financing system. Our aim is to understand whether the 25 monetary transmission mechanism is more effective when banks or markets provide 26 the majority of liquidity in the economy. As an approximation, we characterize the 27 Euro Area financial system as a banking friction, and the US one to the (stock) 28 market friction. 
5
The statistical analysis shows that while market-based financial systems gener-6 ate high asymmetries over the business cycles and a high probability mass on the 7 extremes, the bank based one produces the contrary. Also the second, third and Aggregate Demand: 
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Note: GDP deflator was used as the inflation indicator, 3-month T-bill for the riskfree interest rate, the deposit rate as the savings indicator and the Corporate lending risk spread (Moody's 30-year BAA-AAA corporate bond rate) as the counterpart for the firm borrowing spread in the models. The variables that are left blank do not have a direct counterpart in the data sample. These are also called 'deep variables'. The only way is to estimate a structural model (using for instance Bayesian techniques) and to derive a value based on a (theoretical) structure. Alternatively, one could also approximate values using micro data. However, this is outside the scope of this paper. Note: The moments are calculated taking real GDP as the denominator. These are calculated using the full sample of US data stretching from 1953:I -2014:IV. During this period, the US economy experienced 10 cycles (using NBER business cycle dates), and the average GDP increase per quarter during expansions was 1.05% while it was -0.036% during recessions. The data were de-trended using a standard two-sided HP filter before the moments were calculated in order to facilitate comparison with the model generated (cyclical) moments. The variables that are left blank do not have a direct counterpart in the data sample. These are also called 'deep variables'. The only way is to estimate a structural model (using for instance Bayesian techniques) and to derive a value based on a (theoretical) structure. Alternatively, one could also approximate values using micro data. However, this is outside the scope of this paper. 
